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The goal of this thesis is to examine the
negotiation/conflict environment and develop some proposed
effects that Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) have on the
socio- emotional climate. This introduction of NSS into the
negotiation cycle is expected to change the way in which
bargaining parties interact. Normative and socio- emotional
biases, while not completely eliminated, may be controlled and
limited to a degree. This study suggests that shared use of
NSS during negotiation helps users by structuring the session
to better refine the party's objectives and tactfully convey
them to the other party. Additionally, through better
appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the other
party's position and arguments, interest differentials may be
identified more quickly and thus negotiations may move towards
a more integrative solution. A proposed research design is
presented to evaluate whether use of NSS can improve resource
consumption, decision quality, perceived fairness, perceived
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I . INTRODUCTION
With the increasing interaction of people in a global
community, the role of negotiations has expanded in both
complexity and criticality. These developments demonstrate
the need for negotiating agreements of better quality and at
quicker speeds to keep up with the growing demands of today's
negotiating parties. The often conflicting goals of better
agreements in a shorter time have become increasingly
achievable by the introduction of modern computing tools and
negotiation support software. These Negotiation Support
Systems (NSS) are interactive, computer-based tools intended
to aid negotiating parties in reaching agreement through
support of information exchange while eliminating
communication barriers among parties. Additionally, by
providing techniques for structured decision analysis and by
controlling the patterns and timing of negotiations, more
integrative outcomes are expected (Jelassi & Foroughi, 1989).
This thesis is intended to develop and explore the effect
NSS may have on the process and outcomes of negotiations.
Through research of current negotiation and conflict
literature, several possible effects of NSS have been
proposed. While this thesis does not perform actual
experimental study, it focuses on the development of a
theoretical framework and the identification of some of the
variables and possible measures for use in subsequent
research
.
Section II provides a general description of the
negotiation process and conflict environment. Section III
provides an assessment of current NSS structure, processes and
capabilities. Section IV provides a theoretical discussion of
conflict and the socio-emotional environment present between
negotiating parties. Section V discusses requirements and
expectations for NSS and identifies some of the anticipated
effects NSSs have on party's perceptions of decision quality,
fairness, resource consumption, satisfaction, and working
relationships. Section VI develops proposed measures and
experimental settings for evaluating these expectations.
Section VII provides concluding and summary remarks.
II. THE NEGOTIATION ENVIRONMENT
A. CONFLICT
Conflict has been defined as "the process which begins
when one party perceives that the other has negatively-
affected, or is about to negatively affect, something which he
or she cares about" (Thomas, 1992, p7 ) . This definition
captures the idea that it is an ongoing seguence of events,
between at least two parties that have a degree of
interdependence and interaction, and there is a perception
that there is some incompatibility of concerns between them.
These conflicts are often addressed through negotiation, which
has been defined as "a process for resolving conflicts between
two or more interdependent parties. Activity is mixed-motive
(in that parties are motivated to cooperate and compete with
one another)" (Anson & Jelassi, 1990). Models of the
negotiation process include many general assumptions about
human behavior, including the strong influence of economics.
That is, parties have been assumed to choose behaviors based
upon their perceived likelihood of attaining desired outcomes.
Also, the desirability of outcomes has tended to be based on
narrow notions of self-interest (Thomas, 1992, pl4).
These general assumptions, however, ignore internalized
concerns about social/normative issues (Thomas, 1989). These
concerns consider the morality and ethicality of the means
chosen to achieve a given end. Economic assumptions also tend
to ignore the interaction of emotion and their potentially
strong effects upon thoughts and actions.
This is significant in that a party's thoughts and
emotions are particularly important in the negotiation
process. They define the party's subjective interpretation of
reality and help determine a party's intentions. As such,
these emotions are often the target of influence attempts
during the negotiation process both by the other party and by
the intervention of a third party or mediator.
The foundation for each party's thoughts and emotions
involves that party's definition of the conflict issue (i.e.,
deciding what the conflict is all about) and identifying some
general possible outcomes. A party defines the conflict issue
in terms of the primary concerns of each party. This
definition of the conflict issue often suggests some possible
settlements or outcomes. There is a limit, however, to the
number of possible settlements that a party can be aware of
based on human limitations, and usually these settlements
provide only a superficial notion of acceptability to each
party.
A party's conceptualization of possible settlements has
been mapped on the joint outcome space shown in Figure 1
(Thomas, 1992, p23). The axes represent the degree to which
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Figure 1: Joint Outcome Space
(Thomas, 1992)
concern. Point C represents a settlement that satisfies the
concerns of both parties in an "integrative" (Follett, 1941)
or "win-win" (Filley, 1975) outcome. Point D represents a
"lose-lose" settlement, with neither party being satisfied.
Points A and B represent one party's satisfaction at the
expense of the other party's dissatisfaction, "win-lose/lose-
win" (distributive outcome). Point E is a compromise, with
both parties gaining some but not complete satisfaction with
the settlement.
B. NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR
Negotiation behavior can be described in terms of the
portion of the joint outcome space toward which the party
intends to move (see Figure 2). These conflict-handling
orientations at the strategic level are classified and plotted
along two basic dimensions of intent: assertiveness , the
extent to which a party tries to satisfy its own concerns; and
cooperativeness , the extent to which a party tries to satisfy
the other party's concerns. Along these two dimensions are
five strategic intents toward which a party may strive:
competing, accommodating, collaborating, compromising, and
avoiding (Thomas, 1992). These bargaining styles affect the
degree to which an integrative (win-win), distributive (win-
lose), or in-between solution is pursued.
A competing intention (uncooperative, assertive) is an














(Attempting to satisfy Other's concerns)
Figure 2: Integrative and Distributive Dimensions
of Intent (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975)
other's expense. Accommodating intentions (cooperative,
unassertive) involve trying to satisfy the other's concerns at
the expense of one's own. Compromising intentions (between
cooperativeness and assertiveness ) are an attempt to gain
moderate but not complete satisfaction for both parties. In
these three types of orientations both parties are proceeding
strictly from a fixed-pie, distributive, or zero-sum point of
view. The distributive dimension of intent deals roughly with
the proportion of satisfaction going to each of the parties.
It deals with partitioning of a fixed pie. Willingness to
explore alternative avenues, which would expand the pie, on
the other hand, is the essence of the integrative dimension of
intent. The integrative dimension looks at the total or joint
degree of satisfaction of the two parties. At the top end of
this dimension, collaboration (assertive, cooperative) looks
for alternative solutions that would satisfy both parties'
concerns completely. At the low end of this dimension,
avoiding intentions (uncooperative, unassertive) represent the
orientation to ignore or neglect the concerns of both parties.
Most of the attention of negotiations researchers has focused
on distributive (competitive) and integrative (collaborative)
bargaining processes.
1. Distributive Bargaining
In a distributive bargaining session each party wants
ideally to have the whole pie at the other party's expense
(that is, their intentions are presumed to be competitive.)
They also have a minimum "resistance point" (Walton &
McKersie, 1965), which is a point of minimum acceptability--
the point at which the party would break off the negotiations
rather than continue and accept a less favorable settlement,
(see Figure 3). Each party's resistance point and their
target point define the ends of their "aspiration range" . If
there is any overlap between the aspiration ranges of the two
parties, this overlap is called the "settlement range." This
is the range from which possible settlements can be drawn when
trying to reach an outcome.
Pursuing distributive tactics leads a party to try to
motivate the other party to accept a settlement as close as
possible to the party's own target. One of the tactics used
to achieve this is to try to convince the other party that
they will never achieve their own target or it will be too
costly. This encourages the other party to feel they will be




Integrative bargaining is contrasted with distributive
bargaining in that both parties work together to increase each
other's total satisfaction. To achieve an integrative
settlement the underlying concerns of both parties must be
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Figure 3: Range of Possible Outcomes in Distributive
Bargaining Projected Onto Joint Outcome Space
(Thomas, 1992)
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be generated, and the most jointly satisfactory alternative
must be agreed upon by both parties. The exchange of a
party's goals or concerns requires a degree of trust that the
other party will not use that information for competitive
gain, and as a recipient of that information, trust that the
information is accurate and not slanted or padded. The
generation and selection of outcomes also requires a degree of
flexibility among the parties. This exploratory nature is
necessary to truly generate many possible solutions.
C. ISSUE ASSESSMENT
Many conflict researchers express concern that parties
often fail to recognize the existence of an integrative "win-
win" outcome and pursue instead a more distributive "win-lose"
outcome. An important factor in this regard is the way the
party defines the negotiation issues. Thomas (1976) has
identified three important dimensions of issue definition: 1)
egocentricity, 2) insight into underlying issues, and 3) the
size of the issue. "Egocentricity" refers to defining the
issue solely in terms of one's own concern. By focusing on a
party's own concern, egocentric perceptions often generate
either/or sets of alternatives, and thus "win-lose"
settlements. A second factor is "insight into the underlying
concerns". By looking at a problem rather superficially, a
party may completely miss the more important purpose or agenda
of the bargaining session. By looking deeper into the issues,
11
more alternatives tend to be identified, which in turn
facilitates the search for an integrative settlement. The
last dimension, and perhaps the lesser of the three, is size.
During negotiations involving large numbers of people,
instances, events, abstract principles, or precedent-setting
decisions, issues are often perceived as being larger than
they really are. Large issues seem to make integrative
outcomes impossible, and thus tend to arouse higher levels of
perceived threat and defensiveness
.
D. ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
Using economic notions of rationality, a party is assumed
to select a course of action that will achieve the greatest
expected value. This expected value is presumed to be a
function of the desirability (utility) of a given settlement,
along with the likelihood (expectancy) that the party could
achieve that settlement.
According to Pruitt (1983), and Pruitt & Rubin, (1986), a
party's choice of strategy is derived from the utility it
assigns to satisfying both its own and the other party's
concerns. Thus, collaborative or "win-win" strategies are
more likely to be chosen when a party places a high utility on
satisfying both its own and other's concerns. Pruitt has
identified four considerations in determining the strength of
a party's desire (utility) to satisfy his/her own concern: 1)
the importance of the need which is at stake, 2) importance of
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other issues competing for the party's attention, 3) the
party's fear of conflict, and 4) the extent to which the party
feels they represent the interests of its constituents
(accountability) . There are two factors identified when
determining the strength of the party's desire (utility) for
satisfying the other party's concern: 1) interpersonal bonds
between parties, and 2) forms of dependence on the other
party.
A party's expectation of success is the party's subjective
probability that he/she could attain a given outcome - the
degree of confidence that the outcome is attainable. Pruitt
(1983) calls this expectation the "feasibility" of that
alternative. Under conditions of economic rationality, then,
a given outcome (collaborative or competitive) is assumed to
be chosen as a function of both its utility and its
feasibility.
E. NEGOTIATION PERFORMANCE
Conflict researchers have identified a set of criteria for
evaluating the performance of the negotiation system or
environment. Thomas (1992), developed a set of criteria for
desirable outcomes of conflict episodes which builds upon an
earlier work by Sheppard (1984). These criteria consist of:
1) resource consumption during episode, 2) decision quality,
3) perceived fairness, 4) satisfaction of the parties, and 5)
effects upon working relationships.
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Thomas also asserted that successful collaboration
(integrative bargaining) tends to produce superior outcomes on
these criteria. In an integrative outcome, fairness or
justice (Eiseman, 1978) is enhanced since "all parties are
vindicated." With regard to decision quality, it is often
defined in terms of finding the most jointly optimal
settlement. In terms of resource consumption it is argued
that collaboration will take more time than other methods
because of the time spent digging into deeper underlying
issues. However, the time saved by getting a solid agreed-to
settlement in one bargaining session and not having to deal
with the issue again and again makes it relatively efficient
for decision making (Follett, 1941). Increased satisfaction
is not surprising, since collaboration tries to satisfy all
the parties' concerns in a supportive environment. Lastly,
collaboration enhances working relationships in that it tends
to generate trust (Fisher & Ury, 1981), and seems linked to
both increased liking and respect for the other party (Ruble
& Thomas, 1976) .
F. MEDIATION
Despite the obvious benefits of integrative negotiations
there may be times when collaboration does not seem feasible.
There may be insufficient time, the conflict issue may not
allow integrative solutions, the parties may not have
sufficient skills, or the necessary trust and motivation may
14
not exist (Thomas, 1992). Some of these deficiencies can be
addressed through third-party intervention.
In general, mediation works best in conflicts that deal
with negotiable, substantial issues, and are not emotionally-
escalated or deadlocked. The introduction of a mediator
usually addresses the issues of mistrust, lack of skills,
and/or motivation. Lack of time and the nature of the issues
usually cannot be corrected or enhanced by the introduction of
a mediator.
15
III. NEGOTIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
A. BACKGROUND
Due in part to recent advances in computer technology and
the refinement of group decision support systems (GDSS), NSS
has enjoyed increased attention as a tool providing the
possibility of assisting group decision making activities in
cooperative as well as conflicting settings. These
interactive, computer-based tools are intended to aid
negotiating parties in reaching an agreement by combining the
best features of face-to-face meetings, with the computers
considerable ability to collect, organize, process, and
distribute information in textual or graphical form. Lim and
Benbasat (1991), proposed that the effects of a NSS are
brought about by two components: 1) the electronic
communication channel and 2) the DSS itself.
B . CHANNEL
The utilization of NSS in a bargaining session introduces
an addition channel available to the parties involved. This
additional channel is not a substitute for the original face-
to-face means of communication but a parallel and concurrent
path for information transfer. According to Lim and Benbasat
(1991), the computer, while serving as a communication medium,
presents the user with two sets of characteristics: first, the
16
channel characteristics, which refer to the computer's
capability of conveying information in different modes; and
second, the user interface characteristics of the specific
NSS.
1. Channel Characteristics
Different modes of communication are commonly
classified according to the degree of social presence
conveyed. Face-to-face communication usually permits the
highest degree of social presence because it provides not just
spoken communication, but paralinguistic cues (e.g. rate of
speech, loudness, tone, etc.); kinesic cues (e.g. gestures,
direction of gaze, etc.); and proxemic cues (e.g. distance,
social power related to seating arrangements, etc.) (Ruben,
1988) .
At the other end of the social presence spectrum are
the textual and graphical/symbolic modes. It is these modes
that the NSS utilizes as its channel. Due to the differences
in delivery speed between spoken and written/typed
communication, NSS is expected to influence the social
dynamics of the bargaining session depending on both the
social pressure and degree of spontaneity deemed appropriate.
In addition, electronic textual communication affords the
possibility of anonymity within a party, message formatting,




In addressing the function of the user interface,
attention has been directed to how closely the interface
mimics human interpersonal communication, substitutes for it,
or augments capabilities that humans do not possess. In
addition, due to the large selection of media available, the
impact of media selection, the burden on the user, and the
timing of media introduction cannot be ignored (Lim &
Benbasat, 1991)
.
Ease of use is an especially important factor when
considering the introduction of computer-based tools. The
interface ideally will have no detrimental effect on the
negotiations and the parties using it, and in fact may augment
communication. To reduce potential distraction between the
parties, it is recommended that information requests and
displays be prominent and clear, and their use should be
relatively intuitive or easy for the parties to learn.
C. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR NEGOTIATION
Decision support software available for NSS include
integrated modeling capabilities (such as risk analysis),
decision trees, multi-attribute functions and other
forecasting methods. Also available are structured group
processes such as electronic brain storming, and Nominal Group
and Delphi techniques (Jelassi & Foroughi, 1989). Using the
structure and processing capabilities of the computer has been
18
shown to help enable parties to define and prioritize issues,
generate alternatives, and to assist in evaluating conflicting
solutions, often reducing the effects of distracting and
compromising psychological and sociological factors present.
The presence of emotional and normative conflicts among
negotiating parties, and the need to control or monitor their
impact provides much of the impetus for the development of
this thesis.
19
IV. CONFLICT AND SOCIO-EMOTIONAL FACTORS
A. A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
Because of the strong influence of economics in the
conflict/negotiation literature, prevailing assumptions have
tended to be rational/instrumental in nature. Parties have
been assumed to choose behaviors based on their perceived
likelihood of attaining desired outcomes. While these
assumptions tend to be accurate, there are several factors
that are omitted in this process model. First, strict
economic rationalization does not take into account
social/normative issues present in the negotiation
environment. Thus, in an explanation of behavior, there is a
tendency to ignore the extent to which individuals consider
the normative acceptability (morality, ethicality) of the
means chosen to achieve a given end. Second, economic
assumptions tend to "sanitize" the conflict process by
eliminating emotions and their potentially strong effects upon
thoughts and emotions (Thomas, 1992). Incorporating the
additive cognitive effects of two forms of reasoning -
rational/instrumental reasoning and normative reasoning, with
the influence of emotions, presents a closer approximation of
the dynamics taking place during the negotiation process.
20
As a part of the often ignored impact of normative
reasoning and emotions on the negotiation scenario,
negotiators' perceptions, of whether trust or domination is a
driving motivator, tend to direct the course of negotiations
down separate and mutually incompatible paths. These
perceptions tend to arouse different emotions and different
notions of what is normatively appropriate. Pruitt and Rubin,
(1986); and Sheffield, (1991), stated that mutual trust is a
necessary condition for parties to share information, which
leads to high joint outcomes, while domination is a form of
withholding information and often results in low joint
outcomes. This frequently results from a systematic intuitive
bias that distorts a negotiator's behavior. By assuming that
their interests are in direct conflict with each other,
parties make certain assumptions that limit creativity and
problem solving and diminish the probability of an integrative
outcome (Bazerman, 1983). This bias introduces a tendency to
underestimate the possibility of integrative outcomes, and to
overestimate the conflict of interest between parties.
Recognizing this bias and working to alleviate it should allow
parties to be directed away from perhaps their intuitive
distributive bargaining orientation so more solutions of
higher joint outcomes can be generated.
21
B. SPECIFIC CAUSAL DYNAMICS OF NSS
Figure 4 presents a general model of the negotiation
process and the role played by the NSS which incorporates
Thomas' (1992) model of the events in a conflict process. For
simplicity's sake, the model is based on the assumption that
a single individual represents each of the negotiating
parties, that he/she is acting autonomously, and both have
complete authority and bear complete responsibility for their
actions and outcomes. Additionally, the problem(s) and issues
at conflict are assumed to be non-trivial, in that multiple
issues are at stake. As complex situations are more likely to
tax the capabilities of the parties involved, inherent
limitations, in the negotiation process and individuals
involved, can become accentuated, and thus more likely to be
recognized.
The process begins with the party's awareness of the
conflict and is experienced in terms of the corresponding
thoughts and emotions concerning the situation and possible
responses to it. The thoughts and emotions result in the
formulation of intentions which, when structured by the
processing capabilities of the NSS, result in the party's
behavior. The other party then has thoughts and emotions
concerning the situation, which are in turn translated to
intentions and behaviors via the NSS, and from this comes an













Figure 4 : Basic model of negotiation incorporating NSS
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repeated until both parties accept the outcome or break off
from negotiations (Thomas, 1992, p 16).
A party's thoughts and emotions are particularly important
in the negotiation process. They heavily influence the
party's subjective perceptions which in turn help determine a
party's intentions. As such, these factors are often the
target of influence attempts during the negotiation process by
the other party, and it is this area this thesis chooses to
focus on.
1. Awareness
Going back to the original definition of conflict, the
episode begins when one party becomes aware that another party
has negatively or is about to negatively affect something that
he/she cares about. Here the party may become aware of at
least one of three basic types of conflicts: 1) goal
conflicts, 2) judgement conflicts, and 3) normative conflicts
(Thomas, 1992, p. 18). In the types of negotiations treated
in this thesis, the central issues involve goal conflicts.
The other types of conflict, if they arise, introduce
peripheral issues which distract from the central issues.
a. Goal Conflicts
Goal conflicts are a development of parties
seeking divergent or apparently incompatible outcomes. This
type of conflict is a driving force in adopting a distributive
bargaining orientation, in that seeking attainment of one's
24
own goals is done, if necessary, at the expense of the other
party's attainment of theirs. While some goal conflict is
inevitable at the beginning of negotiations, ideally parties
can identify and generate suitable alternatives so as not to
block attainment for the other party while still satisfying
their own agenda.
Entering a bargaining session with the perception
of incompatible goals often introduces a distributive bias.
This bias has been shown to generate more hostility and
mistrust between parties and diminishes the number of suitable
solutions generated (Bazerman, 1983).
b. Judgement Conflicts
Judgement conflicts differ from goal conflicts in
that, while two parties may share the same goal, they disagree
over the best way of achieving it. The differences come from
different interpretations of the same factual information.
Both parties believe that the other has come to an incorrect
conclusion regarding that information (Thomas, 1992, p. 18).
One of the possible assumptions made in building
one's belief that the other is in error, is that one party
believes they have information the other does not have. A
variation of that theme is that one party feels the other is
using improper reasoning in arriving at their conclusion and
that they do not understand the "true" problem or issues at
stake. Many of these biases are based, in part, on poor or no
25
communication between parties, and thus some degree of
ignorance may be present in evaluating the other party's
knowledge background.
c. Normative Conflicts
Normative conflicts are manifested in a party's
assessment and expectations on how the other party should
behave. Problems develop when one party appears to violate
the standards of the other and feelings of disapproval, blame,
anger, and hostility may be felt by the party who felt
wronged. This can escalate into sanctions to enforce
conformity or to punish the other party, easily resulting in
sub-optimal agreements or deadlock (Thomas & Pondy, 1977).
Normative criteria applied to conflict management
involve the feelings of fairness and justice both as applied
to distributive justice (the fairness of the ultimate
settlement) and to procedural justice (the fairness of the
procedure for arriving at the settlement) (Thomas, 1992).
Perceptions of distributive justice are made up of several
criteria, such as: 1) equitability, 2) consistency of results
with similar conflicts, 3) the relative needs of the parties,
and 4) consistency with accepted rules and norms. The
perception that these criteria are satisfactory or fit within
the party's allowable norms leads a party to view the outcome
as acceptable.
26
Normative procedural justice as identified by
Sheppard, (1984) and Thomas, (1992) involves: 1) the
neutrality of the third party, 2) the ability of the principle
parties to control the process, and 3) protection of the
rights of the principal parties. In this, a party's
perception of how they and the other party are being treated
during negotiations shapes reaction during the episode as well
as affects party acceptance of a potential settlement.
2. Thoughts and Emotions
A negotiator's perceptions and cognitive/emotional
state are shaped as a party becomes aware of a given conflict.
Thoughts, which help the party to sort out the conflict and
consider ways of dealing with it, and emotions, which interact
with thoughts, are molded to some extent during negotiations
by impressions of how the episode is developing and the need
to react to it. These values, even if not recognized in a
conscious internal appraisal, will affect the process, and
likely the outcome of any negotiation scenario.
As parties come together, each brings to the
bargaining table their own definition of the conflict
issue(s). This "framing" (Sheppard, Lewicki & Milton, 1986)
of issues involves some interpretation or labeling of the
primary concerns of the two parties, which in turn, usually
suggests a set of possible settlements. With this set of
possible settlements, comes some perception of the degree to
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which each settlement will satisfy the concerns of both
parties. This process has a tendency to focus or freeze
parties on these initial settlements, thus limiting the
further search for more integrative outcomes.
Size of the issue also has an impact on integrative
orientations. Issues appear larger when they are seen to
involve large numbers of people, instances, events, abstract
principles, or as trend setting precedents for future
interactions (Fisher, 1964). Motivationally, very large
issues appear to make integrative outcomes impossible, to
raise stakes dramatically, and also to raise levels of threat
and defensiveness (Thomas, 1992).
Another key aspect of thought involves the
expectancies of integrative or distributive outcome which are
brought into the conflict episode. These expectancies often
have a self fulfilling aspect that should not be ignored. One
approach to gaining an integrative orientation is to show that
integrative solutions do exist where none were thought to be.
This also involves an element of trust in showing that the
party can be trusted in engaging in this process. The act of
eliciting and defining negotiation problems and issues between
parties often helps them recognize these integrative solutions
(Anson & Jelassi, 1990).
Conflict situations are usually accompanied by strong
emotions. Many are generated during the conflict process
(Kumar, 1989), while others, residual from other events,
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affect the "mood" of the current episode. Kumar (1989) has
noted that emotions have two types of influences that are
relevant here: 1) their shaping of cognition, and 2) their
additional motivational force. Regarding cognition shaping,
Kumar notes that negative emotions, once aroused, feed back,
upon cognition to produce cognitive simplification, reduced
trust, and negative interpretations of the other party's
behavior. These things, especially cognitive simplification,
seem likely to produce either/or conceptualization of conflict
issues, and in general reduce a party's ability to think in an
integrative fashion (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Thomas, 1992).
The source of emotional influences introduced to the
proceedings are often difficult to isolate; however, their
effects are more easily seen. Anson and Jelassi, (1990) in a
summary of Kessler, (1978), and others, identified some of
these characteristics to include:
• Poor working relationship, demonstrated by intense mutual
distrust and little positive foundation in the
relationship
• intense emotional involvement in the issues
• issues are abstract and intangible rather than specific
• unconscious or pre-conscious issues underlie the presented
problem
Emotions also appear to impart additional motivational
forces to a party's rational and normative reasoning. In
extremes, these emotions can exclude or greatly simplify this
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reasoning to the point that behavior becomes primarily an
outlet for emotional venting. Anger and hostility, a
byproduct of frustration, appear to motivate parties to behave
aggressively (Baron, 1977; Kumar, 1989; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986,
Chap 6; Thomas, 19 92) and to attempt to thwart the other party
in win/lose fashion. Anxiety and threat appear, on the other
hand, to motivate a party to withdraw into a lose/lose
position (Kumar, 1989).
Constructive feedback has been shown to arouse less
negative emotion (Baron, 1988). By keeping feedback specific,
considerate, and by not attributing poor performance to
internal causes in the other party, one may promote a less
angry and tense response from them. Baron has shown that
people receiving constructive feedback reported they were more
likely to respond toward a party with a collaborative or
compromising orientation in the future.
3. Intentions
According to Thomas (1992), the combination of
motivational forces such as rational/economic thinking,
normative thinking, and emotions, result in a party's
intentions. A party's intentions are a decision, based on
these thoughts and emotions, to behave in a certain way, and
affect a party's bargaining orientation. These conflict-
handling orientations at the strategic level are classified




the extent to which a party tries to satisfy
its own concerns; and cooperativeness , the extent to which a
party tries to satisfy the other party's concerns. As
mentioned earlier, five strategic intentions can be plotted
along these two dimensions. These are: competing,
accommodating, collaborating, compromising, and avoiding
(Thomas, 1992). See Figure 2 and Figure 5. These bargaining
styles affect the degree to which an integrative (win-win),
distributive (win-lose), or in-between solution is pursued.
4. Behavior
Behavior is separate from intent in that behavior is
the attempt to carry out one's intent. According to Thomas,
(1992), there is always some degree of "slippage" between
behavior and intention, in that behavior does not always
convey or implement one's intentions. In other words,
behavior is the observable actions or statements made by a
party. A problem that can exist due to this separation of
intent and behavior, is the unanticipated effect behavior can
have of conveying the wrong intent through a party's
miscalculations or unskilled enactment (Putman & Poole, 1987).
The Huthwaite research group, (Huthwaite, Inc., 1985)
in an attempt to determine what characterized good negotiation
patterns from bad ones, identified two behavioral tendencies.























(Attempting to satisfy Other's concerns)
Figure 5: Conflict Handling Intentions
(Thomas, 19 78)
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building trust. Huthwaite's work as described by Thomas,
(1992) included:
Less use of:
• Irritators (favorable statements about oneself,
unfavorable statements about other)
• Immediate counter-proposals
• Defending/attacking comments
• Stating disagreement without first providing reasons
• Argument dilution (providing many reasons for each
argument or case advanced, rather than the main reason or
issue)
More use of:
• Advanced labeling of behaviors other than disagreement
(letting the other party know what one is doing)
• Testing understanding and summarizing
• Asking questions
• Giving information on one's internal state (e.g.,
concerns, emotions, intentions)
Procedures designed to reduce the behavior that should
be avoided, while promoting and enhancing the more desirable
behavior, would in most cases be interpreted as a means of
reducing the arousal of negative emotions in the other party,
and providing elements of a supportive environment.
5 . Outcome
The acceptance or disagreement with a proposed
solution is decided upon by the separate parties based on both
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rational-instrumental considerations, and normative judgements
of whether the solution, and the process of arriving at the
solution, were fair (Thomas, 1992).
Thomas described the different approaches to
evaluating the rational-instrumental desirability of conflict
outcomes based on how they satisfy the needs of the
individual, the parties involved, and the system as a whole.
"Partisan" approaches are identified with satisfying the needs
of just one of the parties involved. Skills and resources are
utilized to fulfill one's own concerns and protect the party
from the other. "Joint-welfare" approaches are directed at
satisfying the goals and concerns of both parties. Raiffa
(1982) and Boulding (1963) equated the goodness or quality of
the settlement with its pareto-optimality . This has also been
described as "win-win" (Filley, 1975) and "integrative"
(Thomas, 1976) outcomes. "Systemic" approaches are concerned
not just with the joint welfare of the parties but also with
the consequences of the conflict for the larger system.
Normative satisfaction with the outcome has been
broken into both distributive and procedural justice.
Eiseman (1978, p. 136) stated that collaboration
("integration") enhances both parties' sense of justice since
"all parties are vindicated." Normative approval of
collaboration is also indicated since collaboration is rated
as the most socially desirable of the strategic intents
(Thomas & Kilmann, 1975). Additionally, collaboration and
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decision quality have been linked because decision quality has
often been defined in terras of finding the most jointly
optimal solution (Thomas, 1992). Lastly, the exchange of
information, and the exploration of deeper underlying issues
presumably produce greater learning for both parties, which
translates to improved decision making on other similar tasks.
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V. REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR NSS
A. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF NSS
1. System Configuration
Lim and Benbasat (1991) identified and summarized many
of the components and functionalities of a computer-supported
negotiation aid. The two major components are: a decision
support system (DSS), and the electronic linkage, or channel,
between parties. In their work they have reasonably
established both the usefulness and feasibility of both the
DSS, as significantly aiding decision making, and electronic
communications, as an alternative or supplementary channel.
2. Functionalities
To provide support to negotiating parties there are
several basic functions NSSs commonly perform and many more,
that if incorporated, could affect the integrative orientation
of the negotiation environment. Some of the basic functions
provided by NSS are:
• Support for reguirements analysis - help parties determine
what they need or should ask for.
• Support strategic analysis - help determine what the other
party needs and try to correlate a compatible position
with highest joint outcome.
• Support the interaction - provide a communication channel
for the passing of common referents.
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Some of the inherent capabilities that exist, or
additional features that might be desirable in facilitating an
integrative bargaining environment are:
• Track time - allocate egual slices of time for each party
to utilize.
• Prominent display of issues being discussed along with
current positions of parties.
• Limit or restrict non-task related communication.
• Provide feedback - show parties a history of their past
and present positions and compare positions to pareto-
optimal solution.
Referring back to Huthwaite ' s (1985) summary of
behaviors to be avoided and behaviors to be encouraged to
achieve high outcome solutions, this thesis proposes that use
of NSS, with some of the features mentioned above, can
specifically reduce many of the occurrences that should be
avoided or minimized, while promoting and enhancing the more
desirable actions. The use of NSS is expected to be of some
assistance in the generation, evaluation, choice and
communication of offers in clear and non-provocatory terms.
B. EXPECTED IMPACTS OF NSS ON NEGOTIATIONS
Use of NSS is expected to influence the dynamics of
negotiation by creating an atmosphere that emphasizes order,
rationality, eguality and empathy with the other party's
position. This proposed impact goes beyond the prescriptive
description of NSS ' s analytical processing capabilities (Lim
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& Benbasat, 1991), and affects the normative and
social/emotional tone of the interaction.
Normative and socio-emotional biases, while not completely
eliminated, may be controlled and limited to a degree. The
primary purpose of a NSS as a group support system is to
reduce discordance and seek consensus (Bui, 1991). The
negotiator's NSS is supposed to help the users by structuring
the session to better refine the party's objectives and
tactfully convey them to the other party. In addition, by
appreciating better the strengths and weaknesses of the other
party's position and arguments, interest differentials may be
identified more quickly and thus negotiations may move towards
a more integrative solution (Bui, 1991). Some of the expected
benefits imposed by the structure of the NSS are:
• Identify controversy, and clarify and prioritize
issues/criteria
• Think across issues (examine issues from various
perspectives
)
• Manage number and size (keeps issues from growing larger
than they really are)
• Equalize parties (both parties have fair and equal access
and control)
• Separate people and emotions from problem (objectify
issues and make them tangible)
• Manage communication (control the flow and content of
communication
)
• Maintain momentum and tempo
• Track bargaining trends (provide feedback to parties on
own and other's performance and behavior)
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1
. Impact on Awareness
As mentioned earlier, NSS is intended to help the
parties focus on key goal conflicts and to reduce the
introduction of peripheral or distracting issues.
a. Impact on Goal Conflicts
If parties are forced to formally define their
agendas and issues in concrete objective terms, a focus will
be brought to bear on the truly important issues. The
limitation, or addition of expressing their concerns in
writing on the computer is expected to encourage the parties
to be explicit and accurate, and removes some of the
emotionally charged atmosphere that often surrounds conflicts.
By removing some of the opportunities that promote argument
dilution, parties are discouraged from bringing in irrelevant
and provocatory agendas which are often related to
personalities rather than specific subject matter (Kessler,
1978; Anson & Jelassi, 1990; Thomas, 1992).
NSS, as a vehicle for identifying and clarifying
problem and issue/criteria statements, is anticipated to
provide a common medium for critique, feedback and response.
This echoing and feedback, in the form of paraphrasing and
common displays, helps assure both parties that they are both
being heard, and are dealing only with the concrete issues to
which the parties previously agreed. They can therefore
concentrate on these mutually identified and understood
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criteria and concern themselves less with defense against
distributive tactics and/or hidden agendas. The combination
of being on a less defensive footing and developing a deeper
understanding of the other party's concerns as well as one's
own, appears to increase the desirability of an integrative
outcome, and to make the other's behavior seem more reasonable
(Eiseman, 1978; Filley, 1975; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Follett,
1941; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Thomas, 1992; Walton, 1969).
Additionally, as a written record of the state of
negotiation, NSS may be used to track progress, or lack
thereof, so both parties can assess their next move. This
history of positions taken could also be used to recognize if
parties have reverted to an earlier unproductive position and
thus help prevent a circular set of arguments. Similarly, NSS
may help reestablish productive negotiations at a previous
mutually agreeable state, if pursuit of agreement becomes
deadlocked.
b. Impact on Judgement Conflicts
NSS may have some effect in helping reduce the
impact of judgement conflict. The NSS is expected to
facilitate this by forcing parties to separate the problem or
goal statement(s) from the issues and criteria surrounding the
problem. Finding agreement on the mix of criteria, which is
essential, can frequently be obscured by the introduction of
seemingly relevant judgement concerns that: 1) while
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important, should have been resolved earlier, or 2) are
irrelevant, and are used to confuse or dilute bargaining
positions. The "goal statements" are the entire objective of
the negotiation session while the criteria are specific
attainment objectives that, if resolved, will solve the
problem. By combining the different relevant information,
insights, or reasonings of the two parties, more jointly
accurate conclusions may be drawn as to what is the true
problem, and what are the real issues. For example, a company
has noticed a drop in sales, and the production and marketing
departments are trying to reach a solution. The deeper shared
problem or goal is how can the company create more revenue.
The judgement conflict is that marketing thinks it is a
production problem, and production thinks it is a marketing
problem. Due to their different reasonings, perspectives and
concerns, they reach different conclusions which ultimately
will shape the form of the solution they are considering.
NSS in this example, by keeping discussion only on
accepted concrete terms, may help restrict introduction of
intangible concerns (which in this case should be resolved
separately) from finding their way into discussions and
arguments. This would likely affect negotiations later, in
that parties must concentrate on concrete issues that fit into
an acceptable package to meet the other's criteria.
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c. Impact on Normative Conflicts
NSS is expected to have several beneficial impacts
on normative influences present in negotiations. As presented
earlier, perceptions of distributive justice (fairness of the
settlement) are made up of several criteria, such as: 1)
equitability, 2) consistency of results with similar
conflicts, 3) the relative needs of the parties, and 4)
consistency with accepted rules and norms. The perception
that these criteria are satisfactory or fit within the party's
allowable norms leads a party to view the outcome as
acceptable
.
Normative procedural justice (fairness of the
process) additionally was identified as involving: 1) the
neutrality of the third party, 2) the ability of the principle
parties to control the process, and 3) protection of the
rights of the principal parties. In this, a party's
perception of how they and the other party are being treated
during negotiations shapes reaction during the episode as well
as affects party acceptance of a potential settlement.
With regard to distributive normative justice,
first, NSS is expected to enhance feelings of equitability in
that shared NSSs are designed to be completely impartial and
unbiased. The perception that an impartial NSS has controlled
some aspect of the interchange between parties may help
promote feelings that each party got a fair and equal
settlement. Second, consistency of results with similar
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conflicts is also very likely assuming the same modelling
algorithm is utilized. Due to its mechanistic processing, the
NSS should, with the similar sets of data, generate similar
proposed solution sets for evaluation. The robustness and
suitability of the algorithm to the nature and values of the
criteria may provide opportunities for differences to develop,
but this likely reflects differences and lack of similarity
between conflicts. Third, the relative needs of the parties
presents some difficulties which may be partly addressed
through NSS and party intervention. The NSS cannot inherently
recognize the relative needs of the parties, but the
participating parties may. Thus if one party is perceived to
have an unfair disadvantage, and in fairness requires certain
unilateral concessions from a "willing" opposing party to
equalize their positions, the one-sided concession can be
represented by a "handicapped" utility or value of that
concession by the "willing" party. The NSS does not provide
this automatic compensation. Nevertheless, the act of
granting a unilateral concession by a party via the NSS will
be openly communicated and should be easily recognizable by
the other. This in turn can generate feelings of trust and
gratitude and thus promote integrative orientations. This
concession giving if part of the sequence of offer-counter-
offer also affects normative procedural justice. Lastly,
consistency with rules and norms is expected to be enhanced,
as the NSS has provided a formal channel and medium for
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exchange and has helped enforce party adherence to format and
criteria under discussion.
NSS may affect perceptions of normative procedural
justice just as it affects perceptions of distributive justice
on the outcome. NSS is inherently unbiased in its treatment
towards the parties. Both parties in general, should be
equally affected by the strengths and limitations inherent in
the system. Strict adherence to the format and medium is
expected by the application of the NSS. First, the effect of
neutrality of a third party (the NSS) on the process may help
reinforce party feelings that they are being treated
equitably. Second, parties still have mutual control over the
negotiation process because NSS, as a tool and a supplementary
interface between parties, is, in this setting, equally
accessible by both. Face-to-face dialogue, for this thesis,
is assumed to be unrestricted. Ultimate decision to
accept/reject generated alternative rests with the parties,
which reinforces the notion that the parties have not
relinquished control. Lastly, both parties need to feel that
during the negotiations their rights will remain protected and
that they can proceed with reduced feelings of distrust and
defensiveness . The NSS as a timekeeper is anticipated to do
this partly by enforcing an equal floor for both parties to
express themselves. The recognized impartiality of the clock
helps keep parties focused on the issues lest they lose their
opportunity to voice their true concerns. Feeling are not as
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likely to be jeopardized because much of the time allotted to
dialogue is perceived to be under the control of the NSS and
not the other party. NSS, for this and similar arguments
presented earlier, is expected to help reassure parties that
their interests are being protected through the formal channel
and strict format provided via the system.
2. Impact on Thoughts and Emotions
As mentioned earlier, when parties come together, each
brings to the bargaining table their own definition of the
conflict issue(s), interpretations, and possible solutions or
settlements. This process has a tendency to focus or freeze
parties on these initial settlements, thus limiting the
further search for more integrative outcomes.
One possibility of thwarting this fixation on the
immediately suggested solution set, would be to provide a
means to force parties to examine issues not as predetermined
either/or decisions but recognize that integrative outcomes do
exist (Bazerman, 1986). NSS, it is proposed, through its
additional textual common channel encourages parties to define
their concerns concretely and in a way that stands up to
critique. This in turn promotes discussion, which encourages
both parties to explore deeper understanding of the problems
and issues before them. Directing a party away from taking a
strict "egocentric" (Thomas, 1976) position allows parties to
explore these deeper insights into the issues. This
45
appreciation of underlying concerns encourages collaborative
problem-solving (Eiseman, 1978; Filley, 1975).
Size of the issue also has an impact on perceptions
and integrative orientations. Motivationally, very large
issues appear to make integrative outcomes impossible, to
raise stakes dramatically, and also to raise high levels of
threat and defensiveness (Thomas, 1992).
NSS is expected, as a shared tool with processing
power generally superior to human capabilities, to help
control the manipulation and organization of large and
numerous issues, thus managing the scope to more human
proportions and discouraging a distributive orientation.
Conflict situations are usually accompanied by strong
emotions. Many are generated during the negotiation process
(Kumar, 1989), while others, residual from other events,
affect the "mood" of the current episode.
NSS, with its restricted communication channel, and by
encouraging equal objective dialogue, may reduce the
development and ultimate conveyance of feelings of anxiety and
threat as well as help prevent the escalation of provocatory
feelings
.
There are a number of tactics, which may be
facilitated by use of NSS, that recognize and use the
influence and restriction of emotions to pursue an integrative
strategy (Thomas, 1992). The first is to avoid any
unnecessary angering of the other party toward oneself which
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might intensify the other's win-lose intentions. NSS, while
not able to completely prevent escalation, is expected to help
provide a stable, non-provocatory environment in which to
discuss and explore problems, issues, and options. By
utilizing a communication format that limits personal, non-
task related comments from being passed, focus is turned to
the tangible issues defined during pre-negotiations . NSSs
that do include an open dialogue window to convey personal
thoughts may introduce the opportunity to convey non-task
related and possible provocatory communication. However, most
social and emotional communication is passed through
paralinguistic, proxemic and kinesic cues (Ruben, 1988) which
can be screened out if the NSS acts as the only form of
communication
.
A second tactic used to develop an integrative outcome
would be to facilitate the communication of positive emotions.
This is done not only to interfere with possible anger from
the other party but also to put the other party in a more
generous mood. In general, NSSs do not appear particularly
suited toward this type of support due to the very emotion-
inhibiting structure that gives it its stability. However, by
supporting normative distributive and procedural justice,
feelings of eguitability, fairness, satisfaction and




As previously discussed, the combination of
motivational forces such as rational/economic thinking,
normative thinking, and emotions result in a party's
intentions, which, at the strategic level are classified and
plotted along two basic dimensions of intent: assertiveness
,
the extent a party goes to satisfy its own concerns; and
cooperativeness
, the extent a party takes to satisfy the other
party's concerns.
The introduction of NSS is expected to have an impact
by overcoming a distributive orientation if it is present.
The goal is to get the parties to pursue a collaborative
(cooperative, assertive) and integrative intention. It is in
this way that both parties attempt to fully satisfy their
joint concerns. NSS is believed to facilitate this
integrating, or bringing together of the two parties, in order
to confront (work through) the conflict. By providing a
formal structured medium in which to convey their concerns,
NSS may initiate dialogue where none was present before. Poor
or no communication directed at the primary issues is the gap
NSS is expected to fill.
4 . Impact on Behavior
Because behavior is separate from intent, there is
always some degree of "slippage" between the two, in that
behavior does not always convey or implement one's intentions.
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Due to its structure and formality, NSS is expected to reduce
the amount of "slippage" between intentions formed earlier in
the negotiation session, and the behavior intended to carry-
out that intent. This in effect, reduces the unanticipated
effect behavior can have of conveying the wrong intent through
a party's miscalculations or unskilled enactment. The more
predictable environment for both parties is expected to save
time and enhance feelings of control.
5 . Impact on Outcome
NSS is expected to have several impacts on negotiation
outcome based on both rational-instrumental considerations,
and normative/emotional judgements of whether the solution,
and the process of arriving at the solution, were fair. Some
of the evaluation criteria used during outcome evaluation
include
:
• Resource consumption (primarily how much time is expended
in reaching a settlement)
• Decision quality (is the solution acceptable both in
economic and normative quality)
• Perceived fairness (is settlement and procedure used fair
to both parties)
• Satisfaction (does agreement satisfy parties economically
and normatively)
• Working relationship (what impact will the negotiation
episode have on future relationships)
These are the specific areas where it is expected that
the use of NSS can aid negotiators. Should agreement be
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reached, the negotiations are over. With no agreement,
another set of thoughts and emotions are generated, and an
iterative cycle develops with the formulation of intentions
and modified bargaining positions, which, when processed and
filtered by the NSS and evaluated by the parties, will be
demonstrated through behavior, and result in either accepting
or rejecting a newly generated solution. The cycle continues
until acceptance is reached or one of the parties breaks off
from negotiation.
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VI. A PROPOSED RESEARCH DESIGN
A. PROPOSED METHOD
An objective of the evaluation of the concepts proposed in
this thesis, would be to formally test the impact NSSs have on
the criteria for evaluating the outcomes of the negotiation.
These criteria: 1) resource consumption, 2) decision quality,
3) perceived fairness, 4) satisfaction of the parties, and 5)
effects upon working relationships; all impact a party's
acceptance of a generated solution or willingness to use the





Resource consumption (time) will be lower
for parties utilizing NSS than for those that are not.
One of the first expected effects of the use of NSS is
that resource consumption (time) used in achieving a solid,
long lasting agreement will be less for parties utilizing NSS
than for those that do not. The emphasis of this statement is
on the long term time savings because negotiating a quality
settlement, while perhaps initially more time consuming, is
expected to save time ultimately in that the same conflict






Decision quality will be greater for
parties utilizing NSS than for those that are not.
Decision quality is another area that NSS is
hypothesized to impact. Quality here will be defined in terms
of the amount of utility of the decision for the two parties.
By utilizing a system of rankings for the issues under
discussion along with the values for these issues, outcomes
can be evaluated objectively by the utility they provide. NSS
provides both the generation and presentation of joint and
individual utility that allows the results to be easily




Hypothesis Perceived fairness of the negotiation
process and of the outcome will be higher for parties
utilizing NSS than for those that are not.
Fairness has two interpretations, fairness of the
process and fairness of the outcome. Both are subjective
perceptions based on how a party feels they are, or were
treated as compared to the other party or some ideal, and how
"just" they feel the outcome was. NSS is expected to increase
a party's perception that they are being treated fairly
(procedural), and that the settlement is fair (distributive)
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by being consistent, being equitable, aiding communications,
and building trust. Because perceptions of fair outcomes are
established not just at the conclusion, but during the process
of negotiations, NSS's affect on procedural fairness is






Satisfaction with the outcome will be
greater for parties utilizing NSS than for those that are
not
.
Because satisfaction is often associated with decision
quality there is rational economic justification for accepting
a solution as satisfactory. NSS with its modeling and
processing capabilities can generate the jointly optimal
solutions needed to feel satisfied economically. Satisfaction
is also felt toward the process, and normative perceptions of
fairness, morality, ethicality, etc. all affect party
procedural satisfaction. NSS is expected to impact this area
just as it does for feelings of fairness. Because
satisfaction with the outcome is established not just at the
conclusion, but during the process of negotiations, NSS's
affect on procedural satisfaction is anticipated to also





Working relationships will be better for
parties utilizing NSS than for those that are not.
A benefit of the collaborative environment that is
expected to be generated by NSS is its effect on the quality
of working relationships. Perceptions of collaboration in the
other party are linked to feelings of both liking and respect
(Ruble & Thomas, 1976) for that party, and collaboration is
also believed to generate trust. The employment of NSS to
communicate and share information is expected to help create
the very type of open supportive environment upon which
collaboration depends. This in turn should promote the
conditions and environment that build long term working
relationships
.
Working relationships may not exist between parties
other than for the negotiation session they are participating
in. However, for some parties the ability to work
productively together in the future depends on maintaining or
building relationships that support, or at least do not hinder
each other. Some parties come together with relationships
already strained from past confrontations or events, or they
may not recognize a need to be able to work together now or in
the future. NSS is hypothesized to enhance working relations
for parties who use it.
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C. PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
The following experimental setting is only one of many-
possible formats that would be useful in evaluating the
validity of these hypotheses. The procedures and premises are
intended as a frame of reference or a starting point for
future research. Additional development of the concepts and
the research environment are both expected and encouraged.
This thesis proposes that post-questionnaires be utilized
to capture the perceptions and feelings of negotiation
participants. In order to provide a comparison of the effects
of negotiations with NSS as opposed to negotiations without
it, it is recommended that two groups of parties be employed.
Using identical settings and equal number of participants, one
group of negotiating individuals should proceed with the aid
of a NSS, and the other group should proceed without a NSS,
thus acting as a control and providing points of comparison
for the study.
Stone's book on research methods in organizational
behavior (1978) proposes several questionnaire formats. Two
that appear appropriate are: listing a statement followed by
asking the participant to indicate the extent that they
agree/disagree, or asking a question with graduated responses.
An example of the first would be: "In general, I'm satisfied
with the negotiation settlement." Strongly Disagree
Moderately Disagree - Slightly Disagree - Slightly Agree -
Moderately Agree - Strongly Agree, while an example of the
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second type would be: "How often did the other party anger
you?" Never - Rarely - Sometimes - Often - Always.
Researchers have developed batteries of such questions trying
to isolate psychological factors. Here are presented only a
few to provide examples for further research.
D. PROPOSED MEASURES AND SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE
Before determining the impact NSS has on the negotiation
process and outcomes it is necessary to identify exactly what
measurements to consider. In the preceding discussions
several constructs have been identified. These constructs:
resource consumption (time), decision quality, perceived
fairness, perceived satisfaction, and working relationships,
are the basic outcomes of the process and settlement of
negotiations. Utility, for decision quality, is directly
calculable; however, time in the long term, fairness,
satisfaction, and working relationships are not directly
observable. Thus empirical referents (e.g. scores from
questionnaire measures) of these constructs will have to be
used in evaluating the validity of the assertions (Stone,
1978). Validity will have to be inferred from answers to
various questions aimed at assessing these constructs.
Before assessing the constructs, some of the independent
and dependent variables need to be identified. An independent
variable is a variable which when varied is assumed to be the
cause of change in another variable (i.e. dependent variable).
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A dependent variable is the variable that varies as a
consequence of changes in values of its assumed cause (i.e.
independent variable). Not mentioned but present, an
intervening variable is an unobservable process and/or state
associated with a person or event, that helps explain linkages
between an independent and dependent variable (Stone, 1978).
For the proposed study the employment or not of the NSS would
be an independent variable, and the outcomes would be the
dependent variables. Intervening variables will not be
measured.
1. Measuring Resource Consumption
Resource consumption (elapsed time) is the dependent
variable that, while initially appearing easy to measure in an
experimental setting, presents difficulties because the
ultimate success of a negotiation session is often determined
over a great length of time (does the settlement hold up over
days, weeks, years). As expressed earlier, use of NSS is
hypothesized to save time in the long run because a long
lasting settlement can be reached based on deeper
understanding and appreciation of underlying issues.
Measuring time in a short term, experimental setting may
demonstrate that NSS use actually increases time consumption
because of the increased dialogue and in-depth discussions.
Although short term time consumption can be measured in this
study, it is not the primary focus, and measuring the
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durability of an agreement over long periods of time presents
logistic and control problems. However, there may be a few
indicators that may predict the durability of the settlement.
These are: commitment to the settlement (do people believe in
the process and settlement), and perceptions as to the nature
of the conflict (is it a conflict that will continue to
surface routinely regardless of past settlements).
A sample of some questions that may indicate the
durability of a long lasting settlement are provided below.
These examples all utilize a graduated scale described
earlier.
•I'm confident the settlement is a good one and will not
need to be reopened. (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
•I'm concerned that underlying issues remain unaddressed.
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
• This conflict has always been around and will always be
around. (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
2. Measuring Decision Quality
Decision quality, as the dependent variable, for this
proposed experiment will be based on the utility derived for
each party separately and jointly. These utilities are easily
calculable from data obtained by the NSS from parties during
negotiation. Pareto-optimality would be one satisfactory
benchmark for determining the highest joint utility for the
parties. These utility scores should be recorded for parties
utilizing NSS and for those that are not, and a comparison
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made to determine the impact NSS had. No questionnaire is
suggested for this part.
3. Measuring Fairness
Normative judgements of fairness are based on
distributive (fair outcome) and procedural (fair process)
justice. The dependent variable is outcome fairness, however,
procedural fairness will affect a parties perception that the
outcome is "just" and so some questions in the questionnaire
directed at measuring that may prove useful. A suggested
focus for the questions would be: equitability, consistency,
relative needs of the parties, adherence to rules/norms, third
party neutrality, party control over the process, and
protection of party rights. A few sample questionnaire
entries for distributive fairness might be:
• The decision reached was fair for both of us. (Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree)
• The decision we reached contained an equitable combination
of gains and losses for both of us. (Strongly Disagree to
Strongly Agree)
A sample of questions directed at procedural fairness
might be:
• I felt that I was on an equal footing with the opposing
party. (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
• I feel both parties were treated the same. (Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree)
• I felt we had equal control of the process. (Never to
Always)
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• I felt my rights were preserved during the process.
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
4. Measuring Satisfaction
Satisfaction with the outcome is often linked to
decision quality, so data from the utility generated for the
parties may be an indicator of satisfaction. Because
satisfaction with the outcome is established not just at the
conclusion, but during the process of negotiations, NSS ' s
affect on procedural satisfaction will also ultimately impact
satisfaction with the outcome. The dependent variable is
satisfaction with the settlement. This is defined by how it
meets at least the minimum acceptable needs (utility) of the
party, and is supported by satisfaction with the process.
Again, some suggested question topics that should indicate
perceptions of satisfaction include: needs of the parties,
equity, expectations, and behaviors. Some sample questions
are:
• I achieved what I needed during negotiations. (Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree)
• I am satisfied with the outcome of this negotiation.
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
• I feel this agreement came out better than I expected.
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
5. Measuring Working Relationships
Determining the quality of working relationships is
largely based on the willingness of the parties to work
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together in the future. Since that is a prediction,
determining the basis of that intent will depend on the
feelings held toward the opposing party and perceptions of how
they were treated. The dependent variable, working
relationship, may best be indicated by questions focused on
perceptions of: trust, mutual respect, reliance on each other,
and willingness to work together in the future. If parties
are strangers or will never have a chance of working together,
then the validity of some of these indicators may be
questioned. Some sample questions are:
• I respect the other party. (Strongly Disagree to Strongly
Agree)
• I trust the other party. (Strongly Disagree to Strongly
Agree)
• I would look forward to working together in the future.
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
E. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
To put this proposed research setting into perspective, it
will be useful to provide an illustrative scenario to refer
to. This hypothetical case is not original and is in fact a
derivation of a case described by Bui (1992).
In the aftermath of the Desert Storm confrontation, world
attention has been increasingly directed towards this
politically volatile geographic region. Two major players
potentially concerned with future developments and security in
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the region are the U.S. and the hypothetical Confederated
States of Arabia (C.S.A). Both parties feel, for sake of
argument, that increased U.S. presence, perhaps on a non-
temporary basis, would provide increased stability, and in
periods of conflict, quicker and more appropriate response.
To facilitate this, both are considering establishing U.S.
leased base rights in a strategic region of C.S.A.
The negotiation involves six issues or criteria: 1)
duration of the use of the military base by the U.S., 2) civil
jurisdiction of C.S.A. over military personnel stationed there
(whose laws will be enforced), 3) defense sovereignty (whose
control are the forces under), 4) location of the base, 5)
maximum peacetime size of force present at any one time, and
6) economic compensation. In a study, each party representing
a country should be given a background briefing and
instructions on what values and utilities are desired and
acceptable.
Without developing any particular values, it can be seen
that both parties will have a large number of combinations
that may meet their demands, and among that solution set there
will some combinations that will provide the highest joint
utility. Provided an integrative environment can be
established, finding that/those solution(s) will be the goal
of the negotiators responsible for developing a suitable
agreement. During negotiations it is proposed that parties
will communicate offers and counter-offers both with the
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specific values, and a comparative ranking or utility for each
criteria. The shared NSS will act as the medium for the
formal declaration of each party's positions.
This case is provided because it contains the necessary
elements, structure, and scope for an experimental setting.
First, the scenario contains a mix of both economic and
emotional issues that should test the conditions outlined
previously. The amount of money to be paid as an economic
consideration may need to be weighed against the emotional
issue of civil jurisdiction. Second, the number of
issues/criteria are enough to tax the abilities of negotiators
without overwhelming them (with or without NSS). Third, for
the experimental setting, the positions of the parties are
different but not so directly opposed that a mixed-motive
bargaining session is impossible. Both want an agreement but
both do not want to give up too much. Lastly, the scenario is
real enough that participating subjects may be able to fit
into their assigned role with some degree of commitment and
conviction.
F. PROPOSED NSS TO BE USED FOR THE EXPERIMENT
The software envisioned for testing the hypotheses
presented here is based on a formulation originally described
in a publication on Group Decision Support Systems (Bui, 1987;
Bui & Sivasankaran, 1991). The first character-based, menu-
driven Bilateral NSS program based on this design was written
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in the Pascal language in 1987 and subseguently translated to
the C language and Visual Basic language in 1991 and 1992
respectively. The latest version, to be run on an IBM
compatible PC, is the product of a thesis project at the Naval
Post Graduate School (Sabene, 1992).
The Bilateral NSS is a multiple-attribute, joint utility
negotiation model that supports a two party negotiation
strategy. Negotiation sessions can contain up to ten issues
of contention, and within an issue, each party can assign a
relative utility that falls within the range of values defined
by the party's initial offer. In addition, relative
weightings can be assigned to each issue by the parties
involved. Once party variables are entered for both parties,
negotiation results are calculated and displayed in tabular
and graphical formats (Sabene, 1992).
The purpose of the Bilateral NSS is to assist negotiators
in achieving an equitable solution to a negotiation problem.
Each session allows the user to enter issues and corresponding
weights and utilities. After receiving inputs from both
parties, the program calculates and displays results. This
software supports "what-if " analysis to allow parties to vary
their input variables and see the effects on the final results
(Sabene, 1992).
There are several reasons for the selection of this
software for the proposed test. First, the program is based
on a well-proven economic model for negotiation and is based
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on the concept of pareto optiraality. This provides an
objective indicator, based on utility, of individual and joint
outcomes. It has the capability of handling up to ten issues
and makes use of both the values and weights incorporated in
these multiple criteria. Second, the user interface has been
significantly updated to incorporate the latest graphical
users interface (GUI) techniques and "windows" structure.
This makes operation of the software easy and intuitive to
learn, and relatively non-distracting during the negotiation
session. Third, the output is in both tabular and graphical
form. The clarity of the output coupled with the speed of
most of today's PCs makes "what-if" querying a viable option.
This helps promote integrative party experimentation with




The intent of this thesis was to examine the
negotiation/conflict environment and examine some proposed
effects that Negotiation Support Systems have on the socio-
emotional climate. It also was intended to show the expected
impact of NSS on negotiation outcomes and party perceptions.
As proposed in this thesis, the introduction of NSS into the
negotiation cycle could change the way in which bargaining
parties interact. Normative and socio-emotional biases, while
not completely eliminated, may be controlled and limited to a
degree. This study suggests that use of a NSS as a group
support system reduces discordance and supports consensus
seeking. Use of the NSS during negotiation helps the users by
structuring the session to better refine the party's
objectives and tactfully convey them to the other party.
Additionally, through better appreciation of the strengths and
weaknesses of the other party's position and arguments,
interest differentials may be identified more guickly and thus
negotiations may move towards a more integrative solution.
More specifically, the theories presented suggest that use of
NSS can improve resource consumption, decision quality,




The theories outlined in this thesis are basic ones, and
the experimental setting that has been suggested to evaluate
the validity of these assertions is intended only as a frame-
work and starting point for future research. The impact seen
of NSS on the negotiation environment will be heavily
dependent on further research in the field, and many of the
expected effects will be realized only with continued advances
in software and capabilities.
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